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Abstract—Research evidence in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
shows that the introduced tight coupling of information tech-
nology with physical sensing and actuation leads to more vul-
nerability and security weaknesses. But, the traditional security
protection mechanisms of CPS focus on data encryption while
neglecting the sensors which are vulnerable to attacks in the
physical domain. Accordingly, researchers attach utmost impor-
tance to the problem of state estimation in the presence of sensor
attacks. In this work, we present SecSens, a novel approach for
secure nonlinear state estimation in the presence of modeling
and measurement noise. SecSens consists of two independent
algorithms, namely, SecEKF and SecOPT, which are based on
Extended Kalman Filter and Maximum Likelihood Estimation,
respectively. We adopt a holistic approach to introduce security
awareness among state estimation algorithms without requiring
specialized hardware, or cryptographic techniques. We apply
SecSens to securely localize and time synchronize networked
mobile devices. SecSens provides good performance at run-time
several order of magnitude faster than the state of art solutions
under the presence of powerful attacks. Our algorithms are
evaluated on a testbed with static nodes and a mobile quadrotor,
all equipped with commercial ultra-wide band wireless devices.
Index Terms—Security, state estimation, Kalman filter, opti-
mization, localization, time synchronization
I. INTRODUCTION
Last decades have witnessed a proliferation in Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) for observing a variety of physical
phenomena and provide appreciate control actions. Consider,
for instance, a wireless sensor network which offers many ad-
vantages and services in emergency rescue, homeland security,
military operations, habitat monitoring, and home automation
services. Such a network typically consists of spatially dis-
tributed sensor nodes to monitor the state of network [1].
Furthermore, modern vehicles are another example for CPS
which present a heterogeneous system for sensing dynamics
and providing the required control actions [2]. The new trend
in vehicle design is to move from typical isolated control
systems to more open automotive architectures that would
introduce new services such as remote diagnostics and code
updates, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication in order to
improved quality and reliability of such systems [3].
To use these systems securely and efficiently, we need a
paradigm shift in algorithmic design. For instance, focusing
Fig. 1: Time dispersion of measurements. At time ti of step i
a measurement is taken on one link in the network, where all
the links are under time varying attacks.
only on the use of data encryption is the wrong approach to
assure CPS security. An interdisciplinary approach is needed
that brings a diverse set of disciplines to bear on the secure
design process of CPS algorithms. Such an approach for CPS
should take care of security vulnerabilities that are easily
exploitable in life-critical applications and lead to catastrophic
consequences. These security vulnerabilities target sensing
software, hardware, and physical signals due to the new in-
teraction between information technology and physical world
[4]. Such security vulnerabilities result from the dramatic
increase in the set of sensors functionalities and system design
complexity.
Attacks launched in the cyber domain led to calamitous
consensuses during the past decades [5]. For instance, one
popular attack is the StuxNet attack on Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) controllers system which is
used in industrial processes control [6], [7]. Other security
issues on SCADA networks are shown in [8]. Examples
of wireless network attacks are shown in [9]. Furthermore,
the fragility of the underlying system structure of today’s
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vehicles are exploited to a reasonable extent in [10], [11],
which target Electronic Control Units (ECU). They showed
that today’s vehicles are not resilient against attacks mounted
on its internal components. Thus, an attacker can easily disrupt
the operation of critical functions of a vehicle. This problem
is, even more, emerging with the rise of self-driving cars
[12]. Also, attacks on analog sensors which have increasingly
become an indispensable part of many modern systems are
shown in [13]. Similarly, attacks on CPS could affect the
underlying infrastructure as shown in the Maroochy Water
breach [14]. Moreover, the vulnerability of drones is a very
dangerous threat if attackers can take control of these deadly
weapons [15], [16]. Also, consider the case of generating a
fake GPS signal that appears identical to those sent out by the
real GPS [17] to take over some unmanned aircraft [18].
While considerable research has explored CPS security us-
ing cryptographical techniques, it is not sufficient to ensure for
securing CPS. Such cyber-security techniques cannot protect
against compromised physical environment around a sensor
node, which may inject a corrupted signal. Therefore, there is
an emerging need for secure systems [19] while considering
new techniques. Thus, researchers came up with techniques
that address the problem of secure state estimation and intru-
sion detection under the sensor, actuators, and communication
network attacks. Secure state estimation enables to estimate
the state of the CPS from corrupted/attacked measurements,
while intrusion detection aims to detect the presence of sensor
attacks.
CPS offer critical services which would require meeting
stringent timing and maintaining some guarantees on the accu-
racy of the state estimation during operating hours. However,
CPS have power consumption constraints [20], limitations in
terms of bandwidth [21], computation limitations [22], and
generally limited resources. Thus, we envision a new paradigm
in the designing and evaluating secure estimation algorithms.
Such paradigm requires meeting the real-time requirements
and the resource constraints of CPS. Extensive computation
and high computational overhead to provide secure estimate
estimation are not accepted in our paradigm. To realize this
vision, we propose algorithms for secure state estimation in the
presence of measurement noise and modeling errors. We show
that our algorithms secure the system against physical attacks
manifested by additive disruptions on the measurements while
keeping in mind the practicality of our proposed algorithms.
Up to our knowledge, SecSens is the first solution that meets
the real time requirements of CPS in our considered scenarios.
An entirely representative application for secure state es-
timation is the localization and time synchronization prob-
lem. With the growing prevalence of wireless devices, it is
important to coordinate timing among IoT and to provide
contextual information, such as location. Also, position es-
timation is necessary for different fields such as military [23],
indoor and outdoor localization [24], security surveillance,
and wildlife habitat monitoring. Also, maintaining a shared
notion of time is critical to the performance of many CPS,
Big Science [25], swarm robotics [26], high-frequency trading
[27], and global-scale databases [28]. Localization and time
synchronization involves a significant amount of collabora-
tion between individual sensors to perform complex signal
processing algorithms. This introduces a considerable amount
of vulnerability to the network estimation process. Also, the
problem is challenging due to its nonlinearity, and due to the
high process and measurement noises. When we deal with
time; we are expecting a high effect of modeling errors and
measurement noises. Therefore, we picked localization and
time synchronization as the application driver to illustrate our
proposed secure state algorithm. In this work, we revisit the
secure estimation problem from a modern viewpoint of sensor
networks, to aid in the design of more efficient algorithms
with reduced overheads.
Inspired by the above discussion, we made the following
key contributions in this paper:
• Proposing SecSens which consists of two secure state
estimation algorithms suitable for applications in wireless
networks with nonlinear time evolution and measurement
model. Our solutions are applicable to networks with
pairwise measurements.
• Showing that our algorithm is resilient against attacks
on the sensor measurements while meeting the real-time
requirements of CPS.
• Applying the proposed strategy in the problem of si-
multaneous localization and synchronization of spatially
distributed nodes in an ad-hoc network.
• The proposed algorithms are evaluated on a real testbed
using ultra-wideband wireless devices and a quadrotor,
representing a network of both static and mobile nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II gives an overview of the relevant work in the domain.
Section III defines the secure state estimation problem and
the threat model under our study. We define the core concept
behind SecSens in IV. We then go through our proposed
algorithms in Sections VI-A and VI-B. Section VII illustrates
the experimental setup and evaluates the proposed algorithm
on static and mobile network of nodes. Finally, Section VIII
lists some concluding and discussion remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the related work on secure state
estimation and its application to simultaneous localization and
synchronization.
A. Secure State Estimation
Several recent works have studied the problem of secure
state estimation against sensor attacks in dynamical systems.
We categorize the work to the following subcategories:
1) Secure Estimation for Noiseless Systems: Graph-
theoretic conditions for the detectability of attacks for a
noiseless system are shown in [29]. Fawzi et al. show the
impossibility of accurately reconstructing the state of a system
if more than half the sensors are attacked [30]. Pasqualetti
et al. [31] propose a fully decentralized solution for attack
Identification.
2) Secure Estimation with Bounded non-stochastic Noise:
Satisfiability-Modulo-Theory (SMT) approach is proposed for
bounded noise in [32]. Another kind of work was based on
brute force search which is not applicable for large-scale
systems [33]. A practical solution is proposed in [34] that
considers real-time issues and synchronization errors.
3) Secure state estimation with Gaussian noise: Observing
and recording sensor readings for an amount of time, then re-
peat them afterward while carrying out an attack is commonly
defined as replay attack. Such kind of attack is considered in
[35] where all the existing sensors were attacked. The attacker
does not know model knowledge, but he can access and corrupt
the sensor data. Another work considered stochastic game
anachronism for detecting replay attacks [36]. Also, denial of
service attacks solution under Gaussian noise is proposed in
[37]. Furthermore, false data injection is solved by proposing
an ellipsoidal algorithm where attacker’s strategy is formulated
as a constrained control problem [38].
All the previous work assume linear state space model.
Thus, it can not be used with nonlinear state space. Recently,
Weber et al. [39] proposed Gordian SMT especially for secure
localization which is a non-linear state space. However, they
did not propose as a general solution for non-linear secure state
estimation of networks with pairwise measurements. Also,
during their evaluation, they only considered four links under
attack, which is very small number compared to the total
number of links. Furthermore, they required about 11 minutes
to be able to provide a secure state estimation which is a huge
overhead to recover a network state. Finally, they considered
a 2D localization problem only. On the other hand, SecSens
considers the non-linear state space model of networks with
pairwise measurements, while taking into consideration the
real-time requirements for CPS and assumes powerful attacks
comparing to the related work.
B. Secure Localization and Time Synchronization
Researchers attach great importance for secure localization
from a long time. For instance, SeRLoc [40] proposed a
localization scheme based on a two-tier network architecture.
Another type of work was based on partial homomorphic
encryption to achieve private and resilient localization [41].
For more details on secure localization, we refer the reader to
[42], [43]. On the other hand, secure time synchronization
alone got a lot of attention. TinySeRSync [44], for exam-
ple, proposes secure single-hop pairwise time synchronization
using authenticated timestamping. Moreover, authors in [45]
analyze attacks on different time synchronization protocols and
propose a secure time synchronization toolbox to counter these
attacks. In [46] a holistic approach to maintain secure time
synchronization in a wireless network is proposed, and in [47]
pairwise secure synchronization concept is proposed tailored
to real-time applications in smart grids. For more details on
secure synchronization, we refer the reader to [48], [49].
Although these two problems, namely secure time syn-
chronization and secure localization, share many aspects in
common, they are traditionally treated separately. That results
in a lower performance, inefficient use of resources, and non-
scalable algorithms. Secnav [50] is the only work that covers
simultaneous secure localization and time synchronization up
to our knowledge at the time of writing. However, Secnav
assumes that sensor nodes cannot be compromised by an
adversary, and cares only about the attacked communication
channel. In contrast, SecSens considers attacks which compro-
mise sensor nodes and links.
III. SECURE STATE ESTIMATION PROBLEM
In what follows, we discuss our threat model and the utility
measures. Then, provide a mathematical formulation of the
state estimation problem.
A. Threat Model
In the context of attack-resilient state estimation, we have
the following entities:
• Estimation Server: It attempts to securely, efficiently and
accurately estimate the state of a network of distributed
sensors given that we have measurements and modeling
noises. Also, sensors and links are compromised.
• Sensor Nodes: Entities that make some required sensing
in order to help in estimating the network state. The
adversary could compromise nodes.
• Adversary: He modifies the framework with the goal
of causing the server to misestimate the state of the
network. He can compromise sensor/links to corrupt
measurements. Denial of service attack is out of the scope
of our paper. Therefore, the receiver will still receive
the message from the sender, superimposed by the at-
tacker’s messages. Also, we can look into the problem as
compromised messages where man-in-the-middle attack
(MITM) is presented to corrupt the delivered messages
to the server.
B. Resilience Metric
The accuracy of state estimation algorithm is the key for
its use in mission-critical systems. Besides, the CPS are often
resource-constrained and has to meet some time requirements.
To accommodate the above practical constraints while still
maintaining the desired resilience level we define the following
utility metrics:
• Estimation Error: The difference between the actual
network state (ground truth) and the estimated state.
• Execution Time: The time needed by the server to
estimate the network state based on the measurements.
C. System and Attack Model
Consider the following nonlinear time-varying system
x˜ki+1 = f˜(x˜
k
i ) + n˜
k
i
yk,ji = h˜
j(x˜ki , x˜
j
i ) + v˜
k
i + a
k,j
i ,
(1)
where xki is the state of node k at time i. y
k,j
i is the measure-
ment sent to node k from the neighborhood node j ∈ Nk. The
process and measurement noise are assumed to be uncorrelated
and zero mean white Gaussian noise. They are denoted by nki
and vki , respectively. Qi and Ri are the process covariance
and the measurement noise matrix at time i, respectively. The
attack vector ak,ji is a vector which models how an attacker
changes the sensor measurements between node k and node
j at time i. A non-zero elements in the vector a corresponds
to the attacked values on the corresponding sensor; otherwise
the measurement is not attacked. Thereby, the additive attack
vector ak,ji can account for both, a malicious node k and
a corrupted link (k, j). Moreover, the attack values can be
constant or time-varying.
SecSens considers secure state estimation problem over a
network of N nodes indexed by k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. The
nodes are spatially distributed over some region in space. We
say that two nodes are connected if they can communicate
directly with each other. The neighborhood of a given node k
is denoted by the set Nk.
IV. SECSENS CORE IDEA
Most of the related work on secure state estimation mitigates
the influence of attacks as described in Section II by identify-
ing the attacked links and excluding them from the estimation
process. This is a highly complex combinatorial problem, and
even the convex relaxation techniques are not suitable for real-
time applications. So, let’s go through SecSens core idea that
helps us to solve the problem while considering the practical
requirements.
To understand the idea behind SecSens, let’s consider the
following toy example which is representative of the core idea
behind our solution. Consider a network of N nodes, where
each node has a link with its neighbor. Now, let’s consider
Figure 1, node1 will communicate with node2 at t1. Then
node1 will communicate with node2 and node3 at time t2
and t3, respectively. Now, let’s go back to the general model
of the secure state estimation which is shown in Equation 1.
According to that model, we have three attacks which are
a2,11 , a
3,1
2 , and a
4,1
3 on the three links. Related work tried to
solve at each time instant t the secure state estimation problem
while considering the number of possible attacks (unknowns)
equals the number of links. It ends up in a very complicated
problem with the number of unknowns equals the number of
connections.
In contrast, we look into the problem from a different
perspective inspired by the real-life application’s constraints.
At each time instant, t each node can only communicate with
one neighbor and this is the practical scenario in any CPS.
For instance, measuring the distance using time of the flight
of two or three messages between two nodes is a type of
communication [51]. Thus, at time t1 in Figure 1, why should
we care about estimating a3,11 ?. What about renaming the three
attacks on the figure to a11, a
1
2, and a
1
3 as the couple time
instant ti and the node index k uniquely defines the neighbor
j because node k can only communicate with one node at
time ti. Thus, SecSens looks into the attack that is related to
node1 as a1t and deals with it as time-varying value. With this
paradigm shift, we are able to have the number of attack at
each time instant equals to the number of nodes, instead of
the number of links. Therefore, SecSens drastically reduces
the computational complexity. We will show the performance
of SecSens while attacking all the links with time-varying
attacks. State estimation while attacking all the links is a hard
problem and could not be solved in any of the related work
up to our knowledge.
We now utilize this idea to change the general model in (1).
We include the attack value of this time step to the state of the
node initiating the measurement. Following this procedure, the
state of node k would be extended to xki = [x˜
k T
i , a
k T
i ]
T. This
yields a modified system model with xki+1 = f(x
k
i ) + n
k
i and
yki = h
j(xki , x
j
i ) + v
k
i . In this way, we decrease the number
of unknowns at each time step. Instead of being proportional
to the number of links, they are now only proportional to
the number of nodes. We should emphasize that this is just
a modeling trick and all the links can be under attack with
different values.
A valid question would be how to model the time-evolution
in the state-space model for unpredictable static or time-
varying attacks. We choose to have aki = a
k
i+1, and the
variance of the attack entries of the modeling noise nki
would account for the time-varying aspect of the attack. We
would like to define two important concepts associated with
measurement values:
• Outliers: These measurement values lie outside the main
expected range. For example, it would be the measured
distance between two nodes that is much larger than diag-
onal of the localization area. Also, if the measured speed
of moving node is higher than the hardware capabilities of
the nodes, then this speed value would be considered an
outlier. These Outliers can be easily detected and rejected
by setting some thresholds on the accepted values.
• Attacks: the Smart attacker would corrupt the sensor
reading with new values that make sense. Thus, attacks
are values that can’t be removed by outliers’ detectors.
Attacked speed value, for example, would be within the
capabilities of the node motors.
SecSens makes use of this concept to simplify the com-
plexity of secure state estimation algorithms. We care about
designing secure state estimation algorithm which would be
combined with outliers rejectors. Thus, attacks can only be in
a limited interval which can be represented by the modeling
variance. We used this concept in our previous work [51], [52]
where we use stationary model for process update function for
tracking a flying quadrotor. As long as the quadrotor moves
in the range of the modeling noise, D-SLATS would be able
perfectly to localize it. At the end of the day; the speed of
the quadrotor is limited by the hardware capabilities which
are public information. So why we do not make use of this
information to simplify the estimation algorithm?
In what follows, this approach will be applied to simulta-
neous localization and synchronization. It will be seen that
the system performance is greatly improved by this approach
while the computational complexity is significantly reduced
compared to the related work.
V. SECSENS IN REAL LIFE APPLICATION
Without loss of generality, we choose to apply SecSens
on simultaneous localization and time synchronization esti-
mation problem while some nodes/links are under attack.
It a quite representative example of secure state estimation
problem where we have modeling noise of the clocks and the
dynamics of moving nodes in conjunction with measurements
noise. Our sensors are able to get the time difference and
the distance between two each other. More specifically, we
consider three types of measurements which are distinguished
by the number of messages exchanged between a pair of nodes.
The measurement vector at node k, from node j ∈ Nk has
the following form
yk,ji =
dk,ji + aokirk,ji + adki
Rk,ji + ad
k
i
 , (2)
where dk,ji represents the counter difference at time i denoted
by dk,ji which is the measurement of the difference between
the clocks of each node. rk,ji , on the other hand, represents
a noisy measurement due to frequency bias discrepancies
between k and j which is formally represented by single-
sided two-way range. Finally, Rk,ji is another distance
measurement between nodes k and j based on a trio of
messages between the nodes at time i. This is a more accurate
estimate than rk,ji due to mitigation of frequency bias errors
from the additional message. It is formally called double-
sided two-way range. For more details about the three types
of measurements, we encourage the reader to check [51].
However, these measurements are corrupted by some attacks
on counter difference and distance, namely, aoki and ad
k
i ,
respectively. We would like to note that subset of these
measurements may be used rather than the full set, i.e., we
can have experiments involving just rk,ji , R
k,j
i , d
k,j
i or any
combinations. Also, we do not put any limitation on the way
of calculating these measurements. So, no special requirements
on the used hardware.
Thus, we are concerned with a state vector which consists
of three dimensional position vector pki , clock time offset
oki , and clock frequency bias b
k
i for every node. We adopt
a convention where both oki and b
k
i are described with respect
to the global time clock which is usually the clock of master
node, which can be any node. Also, there are attacks on the
distance measurements, which is denoted by adki , and the
attack on offset measurement values aoki which are added by
an attacked node. In summary our state vector is as following:
xki =
[
pki
T
oki b
k
i ao
k
i ad
k
i
]T
(3)
We define the full network state xi at master time as the
concatenation of all states from the N participating devices at
time step i:
xi =
[
x0 Ti x
1 T
i .. x
N−1 T
i
]T
(4)
VI. SECSENS ATTACK RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATORS
A. SecEKF Algorithm
The core idea behind SecEKF is to make use of Extended
Kalman filter (EKF) in order to estimate the network state
beside the introduced attacks. We periodically apply correc-
tions when new measurements are received. We assume the
clock parameters evolve according to the first-order affine
approximation of the following dynamics oki+1 = o
k
i + b
k
i δt
and bki+1 = b
k
i , where δt := tM (i + 1) − tM (i) given that
tM is the root node time which is the global time. The
process update is responsible for evolving the state estimates
for all N devices—clock offsets, frequency biases, and device
position. Therefore, we can write the process update function
as following:
f(xki ) =

pki
oki + b
k
i δt
bki
aoki
adki
 (5)
Note that this simple process model can still be used to
capture node state dynamics and changing attack values simply
by setting the covariance of the corresponding state value
adequately high to account for high change rate. We will show
that our module can work with high rate changing attack and
moving nodes as well. On the other hand, The measurement
update step relates the state variables xki to a measurement
vector yk,ji between two devices. Each of our measurements
depends on the of local clock values, distances between two
devices and the amount of the introduced attack on time and
distance. For any given node k in the network, the node-
specific measurement model with respect to a second node
j is given as:
hj(xki , x
j
i ) =

(
oji − oki
)
+ aoki
(1 + bki )
∥∥∥pji − pki ∥∥∥
2
+ adki
(1 + bki )
∥∥∥pji − pki ∥∥∥
2
+ adki
 (6)
The time synchronization and localization problem aims
to estimate the clock parameters and the 3D position using
the available measurements and the model of the system. We
denote by xˆi the estimate of xi where we seek to minimize
the mean-square error E‖xi − xˆi‖2. Given this, we design
an EKF to get a secure state estimate over time, periodically
applying corrections when new timing and range measure-
ments are received. Our EKF only updates upon arrival of a
new measurement (message) exchanged between two or more
nodes. The EKF steps are:
• Receive a new measurement: The server obtains a
new measurement at filter step i which is generated
by a message exchange between devices k and j. By
convention, communication is always defined to terminate
at device j. One of the nodes maybe under attack and
corrupt the sent measurement.
• Calculate δt: The server maintains an estimate of master
time tM (i) as well as time offset and frequency bias
estimates for every node. This gives the capability to
calculate the time elapsed between measurements in the
master time reference.
• Time update: Update the current secure estimates for the
location and time of each node while taking the attack
effect out of the measurement.
B. SecOPT Algorithm
The second algorithm for secure state estimation is based
on the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). By using
the model of the system and the knowledge of how the
unknown attack signal affects the measurements, we formulate
an optimization problem as
arg min
xki ,a
k
i ∀k,j
∑
j,k
i′∈{i−L,i}
(
‖hj(xki′ , xji′)− yk,ji′ ‖2 − λ‖aki′‖1
)
,
where a time window comprising L measurements is used
for minimization. The L1-norm on the attack values is added
to quadratic minimization criteria for more robust attack
estimation. The resulting method is summarized in Algorithm
1. The algorithm is centralized in the sense that all the
exchanged messages are transmitted to a centralized server
where the computation and optimization are solved. While the
minimization is initialized for i = 0 with the state xinit = 0
for numerical optimization, run repeat the it multiple times by
setting xinit to the previously estimated state.
Algorithm 1 SecOPT
Set i = 0, and xˆ0 = xinit. At the centralized server:
Step 1: Collect enough measurements between nodes
according to the window size.
Step 2: Solve the centralized optimization problem with
solver initial condition set to xˆi:[
oˆji+1 pˆ
j
i+1 aˆo
j
i+1
]
= argmin
oji ,p
j
i ,ao
j
i
∑
j∈Nk
(dk,ji − (oki − oji )
−
∥∥∥pki − pji∥∥∥
2
/c− aoji )2 + λ‖aoji‖1[
pˆji+1 aˆd
j
i+1
]
= argmin
bji ,p
j
i ,ad
j
i
∑
j∈Nk
(Rk,ji −
∥∥∥pki − pji∥∥∥
2
− adji )2 + λ‖adji‖1
Step 3: Increment i by 1 and go back to Step 1
VII. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We evaluated the performance of the proposed secure state
estimation algorithms in a custom ultra-wideband RF testbed
based. The overall setup is described in details in the Appendix
and shown in Figure 6.
B. Experiments
We demonstrate SecSens state estimation algorithms in
simultaneous localization and time synchronization of wire-
less sensor nodes under attack while keeping on minds the
resilience metrics as defined in Subsection III-B. This attack
can be on the communication link or/and the whole sensor
node. We are going to evaluate our proposed algorithms under
different attack cases for static and mobile nodes.
C. Case Study: Static Nodes
Nodes are placed in 8 distinct locations around the 10 × 9
m2 area, roughly in the positions indicated by Figure 6. The
goal of our algorithm is to accurately and securely estimate the
positions of all network devices relative to each other, as well
as, the relative clock offsets. This relative localization (graph
realization), is a well-researched field. Local minima, high
computational complexity, and restrictions on graph rigidity
are the main challenges in graph realization problems [53],
[54]. SecSens does not put restrictions on the connectivity
of the graph as we will show. An original extended Kalman
filter (OrigEKF) is implemented as a baseline for comparison
to show the criticality of estimating the attacks values in CPS.
1) Secure Position Estimation: We would like to start with
defining the attacker strategy to corrupt the network state
estimation. The common way in secure estimation field is
to consider a uniform random number or constant values as
attacks value without putting constraints on the rate of change
of the attacks values. Neglecting the convergence time of the
algorithm has catastrophic consensuses. Unlike the previous
work, we consider three types of attacks generator statistics.
Also, we consider the attacker switch between different pa-
rameters during an attack session. Function 1 in the Appendix
shows a Pseudocode for our attacker function. We consider
Uniform, Normal and Pareto Distributions as type 1, 2, and
3 attacks, respectively. Note that generating the attack values
according to Function 1 simulates time-varying attack values
that are different for all links. Also, we should highlight the
following points:
• Every new measurement gets different attack value, i.e,
the Function getDistanceAttackValue is called every
time instance for every new measurements.
• All the measurements under attack.
• The attacker changes the parameters of each type from
period to period as shown in the Pseudocode. Such
an attack is stronger than using fixed statistics random
generator.
• The attacks values must results in a location within the
localization area, as a smart attacker strategy. Otherwise,
the attack can be easily detected with a simple threshold
mechanism.
The proposed secure algorithms find relative positions.
Therefore, we first superimpose the estimated positions onto
the true positions of each node by use of a Procrustes transfor-
mation [55]. Specifically, the estimated network topology as a
whole is rotated and translated without scaling, until it most
closely matches the true node positions. Once transformed, the
error of a given node’s position is defined as the `2 norm of the
transformed position minus the true position. Figure 2 shows a
twenty seconds snapshot of the performance after running the
three types of attacks. We can notice the jump in the OrigEKF
behaviors due changing the attack statistics. However, SecSens
is resilient against such type of attacks. Table I summarizes
the localization error for every node using the three algorithm.
SecEKF outperforms SecOPT in the three types of attacks.
2) Secure Time Synchronization: We considered two at-
tacker strategies in order to corrupt the network state estima-
tion in term of time, for the space constraint. We define Type 4
attack where each node adds a constant value in order ∼ 100µ
seconds to measurement dij. While, Type 5 attack considers
adding uniform random values in order ∼ 100µ seconds to
measurement dij. The reason behind choosing these types of
attacks is discussed in the Appendix. We should highlight that
different attacked nodes add different attack values for both
Type 4 and Type 5. As mentioned before, we choose node 0
to be the reference node, i.e, b0i := 0 and o
0
i := 0 ∀i. Table II
shows the synchronization errors for all nodes with respect to
node 0. We also assume that the reference node is free of attack
which is not the same assumption in the secure localization
scenario. In order to test the secure time synchronization with
minimum uncertainty in our testing mechanism, we follow the
testing strategy in [56], and [57].
SecEKF comes with the best performance, then SecOPT
for both attack types. We should note that the synchronization
errors in Table II are reported for a fully connected network.
SecEKF algorithm achieved 0.03 and 0.25 µ seconds for Type
4 and Type 5 attack, respectively. On the other hand, SecOPT
algorithm achieved 0.34 and 9.10 µ seconds for Type 4 and
Type 5 attacks, respectively. Neglecting the secure estimation
techniques leads to catastrophic consequences as shown for
OrigEKF performance against Type 4 and Type 5 attacks. The
synchronization error is in order of attacks values, namely, 121
and 132 µ seconds for Type 4 and Type 5 attack, respectively.
D. Case Study: Mobile Nodes
We have shown that our proposed algorithms can be used to
localize and synchronize a network of static nodes under three
types of attacks. We now present the case of a heterogeneous
network containing both static and mobile nodes. We add one
mobile node in the form of a CrazyFlie quadrotor to the eight
anchor nodes topology used in Section VII-C, as shown in
Figure 6. We analyzed the results of running SecEKF, SecOPT
and OrigEKF to localize the mobile node flying in our lab.
Again, all the links are under attacks. For space limit, we will
show the results under attack 1 scenario only.
Some experiments were performed with quadrotors trav-
eling with variable velocities. Figure 3 show the results of
localizing the traveling quadrotors using SecEKF, SecOPT
and OrigEKF algorithms. SecEKF achieved the best secure
localization estimation with a mean of 1.38 m and standard
deviation of 0.72 m. On the other hand, SecOPT reported
1.82m mean error and standard deviation of 0.78 m. If the
normal estimation does not consider attacks estimation, it will
suffer from 7.03m mean error and 3.54m standard deviation.
We repeated the experiments for the network topology
where every node is only connected to four neighbors instead
of eight nodes in the fully connected scenario, which means we
are dropping about 27 links out of 72 links. The performance
degraded as expected. As shown in Fig 4, SecEKF, SecOPT
and OrigEKF algorithms reported 3.48m, 3.36m, and 10.07m
mean localization error, respectively.
E. Case Study: Execution Time
Previous work [39] could achieve secure state estimation in
case of localization in about 11 minutes. They only consider
2D localization and only four links under attack. Eleven
minutes overhead is a very high one especially for the moving
nodes. We are going during this case study to analyze the
required execution time for the proposed secure estimation
algorithms to localize the CrazyFlie quadrotor, where all the
links are under Type 1 attack. The execution of SecOPT
depends on the number of considered measurements during
one run of the algorithms which we called the window
size. Figure 5 summarizes the 3D localization error for each
window size. For a window size of 300 measurements, we
could achieve a mean error of 1.59m at the cost of 4.6 seconds
of execution time. When we decreased the window size to 50
measurements, we get 4.7m localization error at the cost of
1.1 seconds of execution time. On the other hand, we can see
the SecEKF could achieve a mean error of 1.28m with a cost
of 0.004 seconds. SecEKF considers only a window size of
one measurement as it depends on EKF.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work has investigated the security aware-aspect of
the estimation algorithms for the multi-sensor system. More
specifically, we proposed SecEKF and SecOPT secure estima-
tion algorithms for the wireless network where state evolution
and measurement models can follow nonlinear functions.
Then, we picked simultaneous localization and synchroniza-
tion as a representative application for our secure estimation
problem. Several experiments in a network with static nodes
and a mobile quadrotor, all equipped with commercial ultra-
wideband wireless radios, were conducted. Our empirical
results indicate that SecSens offers reliable performance and
efficient computational procedures for the secure state esti-
mation. Our proposed algorithm made it possible by state-
of-the-art advances in commercial ultra-wideband radios to
securely estimate the state in asynchronous networks. Future
directions will deal with testing over a large-scale system and
more sophisticated attack scenarios.
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APPENDIX
A. Experimental Setup
The main components of our testbed can be summarized in
the following points:
• Motion capture system capable of 3D rigid body position
measurement with less than 0.5 mm accuracy. The system
consists of an eight-camera which are deployed in order
to provide accurate ground truth position measurements.
The results presented in this work treat the motion capture
estimate as a true position, though we qualify here that
all results are accurate to within the motion capture
accuracy. The ground truth position estimates from the
motion capture cameras are sent to a centralized server
which uses the Robot Operating System (ROS) [58] with
a custom package. We adopt a right-handed coordinate
system where y is the vertical axis, and x and z make up
the horizontal plane.
• The Fixed nodes used in the following experiments con-
sist of custom-built circuit boards equipped with ARM
Cortex M4 processors t 196 MHz powered over Eth-
ernet and communicating to Decawave DW1000 ultra-
wideband radios as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Each
node performs a single and double-sided two-way range
with its neighbors. The used Decawave radio is equipped
with a temperature-compensated crystal oscillator with
frequency equals 38.4 MHz and a stated frequency stabil-
ity of ±2 ppm. We installed eight UWB nodes in different
positions in a 10×9 m2 lab. More specifically, six nodes
are placed on the ceiling at about 2.5m high, and two
were placed at waist height at about 1 m in order to better
disambiguate positions on the vertical axis. Each node is
fully controllable over a TCP/IP command structure from
the central server. These nodes are placed so as to remain
Function 1: Attack Generator Pseudocode
float getDistanceAttackValue(type , currentT , totalT)
{
if(currentT < totalT /3)
{
Shift = 2;
paretoScale = 3;
}
else if(currentT >totalT /3 && currentT <2* totalT /3)
{
Shift = 6;
paretoScale = 6.5;
}
else
{
Shift = 1;
paretoScale = 2;
}
paretoShape = 3;
if(type ==1)
// Uniform Distribution
attack = 2*( rand() + Shift);
else if(type ==2)
// Normal Distribution
attack = 2*randn() + Shift;
else if(type ==3)
// Pareto Distribution
attack = randp(paretoShape ,paretoScale );
return attack;
}
mostly free from obstructions, maximizing line-of-sight
barring pedestrian interference.
• The Mobile Node used in the experiments are battery-
powered mobile nodes also with ARM Cortex M4 pro-
cessors based on the CrazyFlie 2.0 helicopter [59] and
equipped with the very same DW1000 radio as shown in
Figure 9. This allows for compatibility in the single and
double sided ranging technique used.
• The server is a MacBook Pro laptop with Intel(R) Core
i7-4870HQ CPUs @2:5GHz, which is a normal PC.
B. Attacks on Distances
Function getDistanceAttackValue shows the attacker be-
havior for corrupting the measurements. We considered, as a
proof of concept, three types of attacks using Uniform, Normal
and Pareto Distributions. We gave them names as type 1, 2,
and 3 attacks, respectively. rand(), randn() and randp() are
considered APIs to get the required distribution. currentT is
the current system time and totalT is the total execution time.
We considered Pareto Distribution as an example of heavy-
tailed distributions. The Pareto distribution is characterized
by a scale parameter paretoScale and a shape parameter
Fig. 6: Experimental setup overview, including, UWB nodes, motion capture cameras, and mobile quadrotor UWB nodes
Fig. 7: Custom anchor node with
ARM Cortex M4 processor and UWB
expansion.
Fig. 8: Ceiling-mounted anchor with
DW1000 UWB radio in 3D-printed
enclosure.
Fig. 9: CrazyFlie 2.0 quadrotor heli-
copter with DW1000 UWB expansion.
paretoShape. We picked the parameters of the distributions
to be logical attack values resulting in an acceptable position
in the localization area. Otherwise, the attack would be easily
detected.
Note that generating the attack values according to Function
1 simulates time-varying attack values that are different for all
links. The trend in the evaluation of the related work is to use
a uniform random number generator to define attack which
can look like some bias in the sensor reading from a practical
point of view. Thus, we used such time-varying parameters
that can evaluate the algorithm in a better way.
C. Attacks on Time
We would like to open a discussion in the types of the time
attacks, as they are tricky ones. Simple monitoring for evolving
time of every node can help in detecting many attacks. For
example, the time should not go backward; thus any reported
time value in the past can be flagged as an attack. Also,
the time can’t go faster than the specification of the crystal,
which is public information. However, we did not consider
this type of smart checkers in SecSens, we just let the secure
algorithms deal with that, but it can be a possible future work.
One popular attack in the time domain to provide a constant
delay to pretend, as if the time is shifted, that is why we
considered adding constant time attacks to the measurements
while evaluating SecSens.
D. Measurements Correlations
Many sensors in CPS reported correlated measurements. For
instance, some distance measurements could be based on the
time of flight calculations which is tightly coupled with time
measurements. Such tight coupling could be investigated to
detect attacks. We should note that SecSens does not at this
stage consider the measurements correlation and dealt with
the measurements as uncorrelated measurements. Many other
practical considerations could be investigated to enhance the
secure estimation algorithms.
E. CPS Physics
Understanding the underlying physics governing the CPS
itself would offer significant support to the secure estimation
algorithms using preprocessing phase which would help in
filtering the measurements. If a sensor observes a signal that
appears to violate the physics governing the CPS dynamics, an
attack flag can be easily raised to enhance the CPS security.
